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As is expected when important new legislation appears, there
have been several Law Journal articles on the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 already published, and certainly there are many more
to come.
One of the most drastic, and probably the least successful, provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code' is the consolidation of Chapters
VIII, X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act into a single chapter,
chapter 11 of the Code. As of this writing I have seen only two
articles dealing with the new chapter 11.2 The article by Professor
King is full of praise for the new chapter, but rather reserved. That
is the nature of the good Professor. The article by Mr. Trost is far
less reserved; it is totally ecstatic. That is the nature of Mr. Trost.
He writes as if the consolidation were a panacea for everyone involved in these cases, debtors, secured and unsecured creditors, and
equity security holders alike.
I find myself at odds with both of these writers in several important respects. Perhaps there is room for a dissonant view of the
consolidation effort. There is some good in the new chapter, to be
sure; at least some small part of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act
has been retained. But some of it is far less good. Rehabilitation of
business debtors has been made much more difficult. In all probability only strong businesses can survive the process, much like old
Chapter X.
This is not intended even to suggest that the entire Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 is flawed. Far from it. There is a tremendous
amount of good to be found in the Reform Act, improvement that
long has been needed. At the head of the list is the improvement in
stature of the new Bankruptcy Court,3 of which Professor Frank
Kennedy has written elsewhere in this issue of the Journal. Next in
line for praise is the granting to the bankruptcy court of pervasive
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, consists of
four titles: Title I is the enactment of the new title 11 of the United States Code, which is
referred to hereafter as the Bankruptcy Code or simply, Code; Title II contains amendments
to title 28 of the United States Code and to the Federal Rules of Evidence; Title III contains
amendments to other acts; Title IV contains the repeal of the Bankruptcy Act and the
transition provisions. Generally speaking, the provisions of the Reform Act become effective
October 1, 1979.
2. Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107
(1979); J. Ronald Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy
Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 1309 (1979). It is noted in passing and without comment that both of these
writers were consultants to the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
See HousE Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. pp. xv, xvii (1973).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, et seq. (West Supp. 1979).
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and exclusive civil jurisdiction over all matters related to a bankruptcy case.' This jurisdiction includes removal to the bankruptcy
court of cases which were pending in other courts at the time of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy court.5 The legislative history
makes it entirely clear that Congress meant by the expanded jurisdiction to eliminate the old dichotomy between plenary and summary jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and to vest in the bankruptcy
court complete jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case and all matters related to it.' All other good things in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 pale in comparison with these two major accomplishments.
I.

WHY CONSOLIDATION?

The idea of consolidation of Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act originated with the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States. This Commission was created pursuant
to Senate Joint Resolution No. 88 in the 91st Congress in 1970.1 Its
report pointed out the inability of the Supreme Court and the Commission to articulate clear and positive guide lines to differentiate
between debtors which should be reorganized in Chapter X and
those which might be reorganized in Chapter XI. It seemed distressed that Chapter XI was being used by corporations with total
indebtedness of as much as $80 million, which the Commission
obviously considered too much for the relatively forthright and direct procedure of Chapter XI. Although the evidence on which the
conclusion is based is not recounted, the Commission did conclude
that Chapter XI had the same potential for abuse as the equity
receivership which had been supplanted by section 77B of the Bank4. Id. § 1471. As the result of a compromise between the House and the Senate, exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases under title 11 is vested in the United States district courts. Id. §
1471(a). In turn, the bankruptcy courts are vested with all the jurisdiction vested in the
district courts. Id. § 1471(c). In addition, the bankruptcy court is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction of all of the property of the debtor, wherever located, id. § 1471(e), a provision
which was included in the rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act (§§ 77a, 111, 311,
411, and 611) but was not included in Chapters I through VII, the "straight" bankruptcy
provisions. The bankruptcy court may, in the interest of justice, abstain from hearing a
particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11,
and its decision to abstain is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. Id. § 1471(d).
5. Id. § 1478.
6. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 595]; 124 CONG. REc. H11107-11108 (Sept. 28, 1978), S17424 (Oct. 6, 1978).
7. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
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ruptcy Act in 1934,8 and therefore should be abolished. The report
continued:
It is not feasible to attempt to carve out of Chapter XI certain cases
which should be under Chapter X. As pointed out by Mr. Justice
Douglas, the facts of each case determine the appropriate relief. The
only solution is an elimination of the disparate procedures. The Commission therefore recommends a comprehensive business reorganization chapter. The Commission's recommendations that appointment
of an independent trustee be discretionary, the absolute priority rule
be made more flexible, a finding be required that the survival of the
debtor is reasonably probable, and procedural reforms be made possible by the administrative agency9 dispel arguments in favor of retaining Chapter XI. Even the desire [of the debtor's management and
its attorneys] to retain control is no longer a compelling argument
for Chapter XI, since the appointment of an independent trustee is
discretionary. °
Even in its wildest dreams the Commission never gave a thought
to consolidating Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy Act" into the business reorganization chapter of a new act. The drafters of the new
Code seem to have gotten carried away; they have thrown railroad
reorganizations into chapter 11,12 and in so doing found it necessary
to exclude from railroad reorganization cases an amazingly small
number of sections which apply to other entities.13 If, with these
relatively minor adjustments, chapter 11 fits this kind of case, who
can contend seriously that any substantial part of Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act has been retained?
Another argument advanced in favor of the consolidation of the
rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy Act into a single chapter
was that this would obviate the often futile, always extremely disruptive and wasteful, motion under section 328 of the Act and Rule
11-15 brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 4 occa8. Section 77B had, in turn, been replaced by Chapters X and XI in 1938.
9. The Commission recommended the creation of a United States Bankruptcy Administration with extensive powers in connection with liquidation and reorganization cases. The
United States trustee which is created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 for 18 pilot
districts is but a pale copy of the Commission's Bankruptcy Administration.
10. H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1973).
11. Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy Act consists of only one section, section 77, and
relates to railroad reorganization.
12. Subchapter IV of chapter 11, consisting of sections 1161-1174.
13. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1161 (West Supp. 1979).
14. Hereafter "SEC."
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sionally by others, to convert the Chapter XI case to one under
Chapter X. In numerous cases such a motion was not filed until the
case had progressed to a point of near resolution of the debtor's
problems.'" Rule 11-15 attempted to halt the inordinate delay which
had become practice under section 328, and required that the motion be filed within 120 days after the date of the first meeting of
creditors and stockholders, but lost much of the ground that might
have been gained by giving the court authority to extend the time
for making such motions.'
These and other premises of the reformers will be referred to and
discussed in the context of various specific provisions of chapter 11.
I.

CHAPTER 11

Chapter 11 cannot be viewed as an entity; it is not complete in
and of itself. But no chapter of the new Bankruptcy Code is. The
Code is as much of a ten-finger exercise as is the Uniform Commercial Code. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Bankruptcy Code are applicable to a chapter 11 case. 7 The definitions for chapter 11 cases are
found partly in chapter 11 and partly in chapter 11.1' Rules of construction 0 and specification of entities which may be debtors under
chapter 111 are found in chapter 1. Administrative powers, including the automatic stay," use of collateral,2 3 the borrowing of
money, 4 rejection of executory contracts," and provisions regarding
continuation of utility services26 are contained in chapter 3. The
15. The classic example of late filing is SEC v. Canadaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1964), in which the filing was delayed until after a plan had been proposed and
accepted by quite substantial majorities. With the filing of the transfer motion the court was
compelled to halt all forward progress in the case to hear the motion. At the conclusion of
the hearing the district court denied the SEC request for transfer to Chapter X and the SEC
promptly appealed. With considerable reluctance the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and sent the case back for the appointment of a trustee and conduct of the case under

Chapter X. Adjudication followed.
16. Rule 11-15(b).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

11 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1979).
Id. § 101.
Id. § 1101.
Id. § 102.
Id. § 109(d).
Id. § 362.
Id. § 363.
Id. § 364.
Id. § 365.
Id. § 366.
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turnover of property to the estate,27 the avoiding powers of a trustee
or debtor," and setoff2 l are found in chapter 5. In eighteen judicial
districts 0 there will be a United States trustee who is given important powers and duties in chapter 11 cases by chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Code,3 ' and by provisions added to title 28 of the United
States Code. 2
III.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE CASE

Chapter 11 is available to all businesses, whether operated by
individuals, partnerships, or corporations. The case may be commenced by the filing of a voluntary petition by a debtor, 33 a joint
petition by debtor and spouse,34 or by an involuntary petition filed
by creditors.35 The requirements for an involuntary petition under
chapter 11 are the same as for a liquidating case under chapter 7 of
the Code. Three petitioning creditors," or a single creditor if there
are less than 12,11 holding claims that aggregate at least $5,000 more
than the value of any lien on property of the debtor, may file the
involuntary petition. The petition need allege only that the debtor
generally is not paying his debts as they become due, or that within
120 days before the filing of the petition a custodian 8 was appointed
or authorized to take possession of substantially all of the property
of the debtor.3" If the debtor contests the involuntary petition, a jury
trial on the issues is a matter within thediscretion of the court. "
The notion of an involuntary petition is a radical departure from
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Clearly the concept is derived
27. Id. § 542.
28. Id. 99 544 et seq. These powers are discussed elsewhere in this issue of the Journal
by Vernon Teofan and L.E. Creel, I.
29. Id. § 553.
30. Id. § 1501. These districts are referred to hereafter as "pilot districts,"
31. Id. 99 151102-151105.
32. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 581 et seq. (West Supp. 1979) (especially section 586(a)(3)).
33. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Supp. 1979).
34. Id. § 302.
35. Id. § 303(a). A petition filed by less than all of the general partners of a partnership
is treated as an involuntary petition. See id. § 303(b)(3).
36. Id. § 303(b)(1).
37. Id. § 303(b)(2).
38. "Custodian" is defined in section 101(10).
39. Id. § 303(h).
40. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1480(b) (West Supp. 1979). Jury trial of the issues created by an
answer filed in a case under Chapter X was not permitted. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 143, 144
(repealed 1978, previously codified as 11. U.S.C. §§ 543, 544).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss2/6

6

Moller: Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened to Go

19791

CHAPTER 11

instead from Chapter X.4
If the involuntary petition is not timely controverted 2 the court
shall enter an order for relief under chapter 11 against the debtor."
The apparent ease of sustaining an involuntary petition which has
resulted from the abolition of acts of bankruptcy and removal of the
need to allege and prove insolvency of the debtor made it necessary
to build into the Code certain protective devices. If the court dismisses the involuntary petition other than on the consent of all
petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right
to judgment, the court may grant judgment in favor of the debtor
against the petitioners for costs, a reasonable attorney's fee, and any
damages proximately caused by the taking of possession of the
debtor's property by a trustee appointed by the court.4 4 In addition,
the court may render judgment against any petitioning creditor that
filed the petition in bad faith for any damages proximately caused
by such filing, and for punitive damages. 5
IV.

THE AUTOMATIC STAY

The filing of a petition under any chapter of the Code operates
automatically as a stay, applicable to all entities," of (1) the commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the filing of the petition under title 11, or to recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case; 7 (2) the enforcement against the debtor or against
property of the estate,"8 of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case;4" (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or property from the estate; 0 (4) any act to
41. Bankruptcy Act § 126 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 526).
42. It is probable that Rule 10-112(a)(1) will govern the time to file an answer to an
involuntary chapter 11 petition until new rules are promulgated.
43. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(h) (West Supp. 1979).
44. Id. § 303(i)(1). This subsection states these various elements of damages disjunctively. However, "or" is not exclusive. See id. § 102(5). The court may grant any or all of the
damages provided for under this provision.
45. Id. 303(i)(2).
46. Under the definition contained in 11 U.S.C. 101(14), "entity" includes a person,
estate, trust, and governmental unit. Section 101(30) defines "person" to include an individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include a governmental unit. Id. § 101(30).
47. Id. § 362(a)(1).
48. Property of the estate is defined in section 541.
49. Id. § 362(a)(2).
50. Id. § 362(a)(3).
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create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 51
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
estate any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case;52 (6) any act to collect,
assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case;53 (7) the setoff of any debt owing to
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case;' and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.5
Certain types of actions specifically are excepted from the operation of the automatic stay. The filing of a petition does not stay the
commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings against the
debtor;" the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from
property that is not property of the estate;5 7 any act to perfect an
interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b);5 the commencement or continuation of a proceeding by a governmental unit
to enforce a police or regulatory power;59 the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action by a
governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power; " the
setoff of mutual debts and credits involving commodities or securities;" the commencement of actions by the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust on
property consisting of five or more living units, held by the Secretary, which is or was formerly insured under the National Housing
Act; 2 or the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a
notice of tax deficiency."
51. Id. § 362(a)(4).
52. Id. § 362(a)(5).
53. Id.§ 362(a)(6).
54. Id.§ 362(a)(7). Even though the right of setoff of mutual debts and credits isstayed,
the right of setoff isnot nullified. See id.§ 553.
55. Id.§ 362(a)(8).
56. Id.§ 362(b)(1).
57. Id.§ 362(b)(2).
58. Id.§ 362(b)(3). This will permit the perfection of prepetition purchase money security interests and mechanics' liens, the retroactive effect of which isrecognized by section
546(b).
59. Id.§ 362(b)(4).
60. Id.§ 362(b)(5).
61. Id.§ 362(b)(6). This provision has no relevance inchapter 11 because those entities
may not be debtors in chapter 11 cases. See id.§ 109(d).
62. Id. § 362(b)(7). It should be noted that commencement of such suit isnot stayed.
Prosecution of the suit is.
63. Id.§ 362(b)(8).
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A.

CHAPTER 11

Duration of the Stay

Except as it may be modified, the stay of an act against property
of the estate continues until such property is no longer property of
the estate; and the stay of any other act continues until the earliest
of the closing of the case, the dismissal of the case, and, if the case
concerns an individual and is under chapter 7, or is a case under
chapter 9, 11, or 13, the time a discharge is granted or denied."
B.

Relief from the Stay

In order to obtain relief from the stay, a party must institute a
proceeding in the bankruptcy court. Because the Bankruptcy Rules
remain in effect to the extent they are not inconsistent with provisions in the Code 5 a complaint must be filed with the court seeking
such relief. The stay may be terminated, annulled, modified, or
conditioned for cause,6" including lack of adequate protection of the
interest of a secured creditor. 7 The stay also may be modified if the
debtor does not have an equity in the property which secures the
claim and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization." The party requesting relief from the stay has the burden of
proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the property; 9 the trustee
or debtor has the burden of proof on all other issues.7
The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
expressed some concern over the delay of the courts in resolving
requests for relief from the automatic stay7 despite the mandate in
the Bankruptcy Rules" and set about to correct the problem. The
method chosen may well put an end to the near-current condition
of the bankruptcy court dockets throughout the land. If the court
does not hold a preliminary or a final hearing on the complaint for
relief from the stay of an act against property of the estate within
30 days after it is filed, the stay is terminated with respect to the
64. Id. § 362(c).
65. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 405(d), 92 Stat. 2685 (1978).
66. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d) (West Supp. 1979).
67. Id. 362(d)(1). "Adequate protection" is illustrated but not defined in section 361.
68. Id. § 362(d)(2).
69. Id. § 362(g)(1).
70. Id. § 362(g)(2).
71. "Too often today, court delay in handling requests for relief amounts to a complete
denial of relief. The court can thus avoid the issue, and yet rule in the debtor's favor. This
bill prevents such action . . . ." See H.R. REP. No., supra note 6, at 175 (1977).
72. Rules 601(c), 8-501(c), 9-4(c), 10-601(c), 11-44(d), 12-43(d), and 13-401(d).
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party making such request.73 If the hearing which is held within such
30-day period is only a preliminary hearing, the court shall order the
stay continued if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party
opposing relief from the stay will prevail at the final hearing, and
the final hearing shall be commenced within 30 days after that
preliminary hearing.7 No time is specified within which the hearing
must be concluded, nor, having been concluded, within which the
court must announce a ruling. If it be true, as the Committee suggested, that the courts have deliberately ignored the mandate of the
Rules for a speedy determination, a complete cure may not have
been effected.
The provisions in the Rules for ex parte relief from the stay in
order to prevent irreparable damage before a hearing can be held are
carried forward."5
Other remedies than the automatic stay are available to the bankruptcy court to restrain interference with its cases. Section 2a(15)
of the Bankruptcy Act has been included in the Code."6 In addition,
the bankruptcy court is invested with the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty," and, having become a "court of the
United States, 718 the bankruptcy court has the power to issue writs
under the All Writs Statute.79
There is the suggestion in the Senate Report on the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 197880 that the use of the phrase "on request""' for
relief from the stay made it clear that the only issue at the hearings
on relief from the stay will be lack of adequate protection, the
debtor's equity in the property, and the necessity of the property to
an effective reorganization of the debtor, and that this hearing:is not
the appropriate time to consider other issues, such as counterclaims
against the creditor. 2 It would seem that "on request" is far too
neutral a phrase to require such result.
73. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(e) (West Supp. 1979).
74. Id. § 362(e)(1), (e)(2).
75. Id. § 362(f).
76. Id. § 105(a).
77. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1481 (West Supp. 1979).
78. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 213, 92 Stat. 2661 (1978) (amending
28 U.S.C. § 451 (1976)).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
80. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978).
81. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d) (West Supp. 1979).
82. This hearing will not be the appropriate time at which to bring in other issues,
such as counterclaims against the debtor, which, although relevant to the question
of the amount of the debt, concern largely collateral or unrelated matters. This ap-
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CHAPTER 11
V.

OPERATION OF THE DEBTOR'S BUSINESS

In an abrupt about-face from Chapters X, XI, and XII of the
Bankruptcy Act, the Code provides that no order of the court is
required for the continued operation of his business by the debtor;
unless the court orders otherwise the debtor. continues to operate the
business.8 The court is removed from any obligation to oversee or
otherwise be concerned about the operation of that business. That
is the function of the creditors' committee, the United States trustee, and the creditors themselves. The court is in the case to resolve
disputes impartially. Until a pleading is filed creating an issue, the
court may not inject itself into these cases. 4 Until the parties in
interest become accustomed to the fact that the bankruptcy judge
is no longer permitted sua sponte to curb the debtor's methods of
operating the business, or order its closing, and learn to take the
necessary action to bring these matters to issue before the court, it
is very likely that assets will be dissipated. In pilot districts the
supervision of the debtor in chapter 11 is one of the United States
trustee's duties. 5 In other districts the creditors' committees will
have to wing it without outside assistance. So complete is the divorce of the court from such administrative matters that the continued validity of local rules such as those which require the court,
without request of a party in interest, to fix the salaries of individual
proach is consistent with that taken in cases such as In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430
F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1977), that an action seeking relief from the stay is not the
assertion of a claim which would give rise to the right or obligation to assert counterclaims. Those counterclaims are not to be handled in the summary fashion that the
preliminary hearing under this provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of
more complete proceedings by the trustee to recover property of the estate or to
object to the allowance of a claim. However, this would not preclude the party seeking
continuance of the stay from presenting evidence on the existence of claims which the
court may consider in exercising its discretion. What is precluded is a determination
of such collateral claims on the merits at the hearing.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1108 provides that unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may
operate the debtor's business. Section 1107 in turn confers on the debtor in possession, with
exceptions not here pertinent, all the rights and powers of a trustee serving in a case under
chapter 11. As is noted elsewhere in this article, a trustee may be appointed only on application, and for cause shown.
84. Although until rules like Rules 10-212, 11-25, and 12-24 are replaced by new rules,
the court must fix dates for creditor's meetings, and may order a meeting of equity security
holders, see 11 U.S.C. § 341(b), the court may not preside at, and may not attend, any of
such meetings. See id. § 341(c).
85. 28 U.S.C.A. § 586(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
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debtors or officers of a debtor corporation" appears to be in serious
doubt.
In the operation of the debtor's business, the debtor in possession
or the trustee will have full use of and be subject to the perils of the
administrative powers provided in subchapter IV of chapter 3,17 and
of the powers in connection with the estate contained in subchapter
III of chapter 5.18 There is no doubt that the administrative powers
of chapter 3 sound better on cursory reading than they will prove to
be in actual operation.
A.

Use of Collateral

"Cash collateral" is defined to mean cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash
equivalents in which the estate and another entity have an interest.89 In addition, if noncash collateral is converted into proceeds of
the type defined as cash collateral, the proceeds must be treated as
cash collateral as long as proceeds are subject to the prepetition
security interest." Stated another way, if the debtor sells for cash
inventory that is subject to a prepetition security interest, or collects
accounts receivable which are subject to a prepetition security interest, these proceeds become cash collateral, and they must be segregated and accounted for."
The debtor or trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral,
in the ordinary course of business or otherwise, unless each entity
that has an interest in such cash collateral consents, or the court,
after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease. 2 Noncash collateral which is property of the estate may be used, sold, or
leased in the ordinary course of business without notice and a hearing." If such noncash collateral is to be used otherwise than in the
ordinary course of business, the court, after notice and a hearing,
86. E.g., Rule XI-3 of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.
87. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 361-366 (West Supp. 1979).
88. Id. 88 541-554. The avoiding powers of the trustee or debtor under sections 544
through 551 are discussed in an article by Vernon Teofan and L.E. Creel, III elsewhere in
this issue of the Journal and are not treated here.
89. Id.§ 363(a).
90. Id. § 552(b). The 1972 version of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as
adopted in most states, automatically applies the security interest to proceeds.
91. Id. § 363(c)(4).
92. Id.§ 363(c)(2).
93. Id. § 363(c)(1).
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must authorize it.94

"After notice and a hearing" is a term to which a rule of construction applies.95 It means after notice which is appropriate in the
particular circumstances, and appropriate opportunity for a hearing. An actual hearing is not required if notice is given properly and
if such a hearing is not timely requested by a party in interest, or if
there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such
act must be done, and the court authorizes the act."6 The matter of
"appropriate notice" is left to rules which have not yet been promulgated. Until they are, it must be assumed that the debtor or trustee
may in writing notify persons asserting an interest in property of the
estate which is to be sold or used that in, say, ten days he proposes
to sell or otherwise dispose of certain property. Unless a party in
interest files a pleading with the court objecting to the disposal of
the property in question and asks for a hearing on the issue, the
debtor or trustee may proceed, without court order, to go forward
with the proposed disposal of the property, and will not be required
to segregate the proceeds.
It is not at all clear what the debtor or trustee must do during his
operations during the first few days following the filing of the petition in order to be able to use or dispose of cash collateral or of
collateral the proceeds of which become cash collateral. In these
days of the all-encompassing reach of the security interest of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the average business will be
destroyed before the debtor will be able to get an order of the court
"after notice and a hearing" to authorize the use of cash collateral
or of collateral the proceeds of which become cash collateral. In an
earlier version of section 363 it was proposed that the debtor or
trustee, without court order, could use or sell what was then called
"soft collateral" for not more than 5 days after notification of other
parties which had an interest in that collateral," but this authorization did not make its way into the final draft. It seems relatively
certain that in most cases the debtor or trustee, as a matter of
survival, will continue business as usual, will reduce inventory and
accounts receivable to cash, will use that cash until the secured
creditor moves to stop him, and, like Scarlett O'Hara, will worry
tomorrow about protecting any interest of a secured party.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. § 363(b).
Id. § 102(1).
Id. § 102(1).
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 363(c)(2) (1977).
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Adequate Protection

It seems to be the clear intent of the Code that before the debtor
may use or dispose of any property in which another entity has an
interest, either in the ordinary course of business or otherwise,
"adequate protection""8 of that interest must be furnished. It was
thought by the drafters that the nature and amount of such protection could be negotiated by the debtor and the interest holders in
most instances, and that the court would not have to become involved. It is extremely doubtful that such optimism will become a
reality. More frequently than not lenders harbor perpetual feelings
of insecurity, and agreements will not come easily for the debtor.
The authorization contained in section 363(c) for the debtor or
trustee to use noncash collateral in the ordinary course of business
without an order of the court in practice very likely will place the
burden on the secured creditor to invoke the jurisdiction of the court
to require the debtor or trustee to provide adequate protection of his
interest. This probably is not what was intended by this provision.
In theory, the debtor would have taken the initiative and would
have reached an agreement with the secured creditor before continuing his postpetition operations. In the midst of the confusion
which accompanies the filing of a petition, only a very few debtors
will follow this course.
The debtor's right to use collateral may become an issue before
the court in another way: the debtor may file a pleading seeking an
order of the court authorizing his use of cash collateral, or seeking
the use of some incumbered property of the estate other than in the
ordinary course of business.
What happens when the debtor's right to use collateral does become an issue before the court? The court is required to prohibit or
condition the use, sale, or lease of the collateral "as is necessary to
provide adequate protection" of the interest in the property belonging to another entity. 9 In any such hearing, the debtor or trustee has
the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection. 100
Regarding the timing of the hearing, the Code tells us that if the
use of cash collateral is the issue, prompt action should be taken by
the court, scheduled in accordance with the needs of the debtor, and
that it may be a preliminary hearing or may be consolidated with a
98. Adequate protection is illustrated in 11 U.S.C. § 361.
99. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (West Supp. 1979).
100. Id. § 363(e).
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hearing requested by the secured creditor.10' The hearing requested
by the secured creditor very likely will be for modification of the
automatic stay to permit foreclosure on the collateral. 0
What constitutes adequate protection? The Code provides no
ready answer. It tells us only that when adequate protection is required, it may be provided by periodic cash payments,' 3 by additional or replacement collateral,' 0° or by such other relief as will
result in the realization by the secured creditor of the "indubitable
equivalent" of his interest in the collateral.0 5 An administrative
priority claim is not the "indubitable equivalent" of the security
interest in collateral. 0
The draftsmen of this provision of the Code have said that the
concept of adequate protection is to require such relief as will result
in the realization of the value of the secured creditor's interest.

7

However, the Committee report offers pitifully little help in arriving
at a measure for "realization of value:"
[All of the suggested means of protecting the secured creditor's
interest rely] on the value of the protected entity's interest in the
property involved. The section does not specify how value is to be
determined, nor does it specify when it is to be determined. These
matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and development. It is
expected that the courts will apply the concept in light of facts of
each case and general equitable principles. It is not intended that the
courts will develop a hard and fast rule that will apply in every case.
The time and method of valuation is not specified precisely, in order
to avoid that result. There are an infinite number of variations possible in dealings between debtors and creditors, the law is continually
developing, and new ideas are continually being implemented in this
field. The flexibility is important to permit the courts to adapt to
varying circumstances and changing modes of financing.
Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term value
to mean, in every case, forced sale liquidation value or full going
concern value. There is wide latitude between those two extremes. In
any particular case, especially a reorganization case, the determina101. Id. § 363(c)(3).
102.
103.
1971).
104.
105.
106.
107.

Brought under section 362(d).
Id. § 361(1). This provision derives from In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
11 U.S.C.A. § 361(2) (West Supp. 1979).
Id. § 361(3).
Id. § 361(3).
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 340.
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tion of which entity should be entitled to the difference between the
going concern value and the liquidation value must be based on equitable considerations based on the facts of the case. It will frequently
be based on negotiation between the parties. Only if they cannot
agree will the court become involved. 108
Whatever adequate protection may mean, it is intended to compensate the secured creditor to the extent that the debtor's use or
sale of the property "results in a decrease in value of [the secured
1 and it must
creditor's] interest" in such property, 09
result "in the
indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property." I",
To be sure that it does result in the "indubitable equivalent," the
Code provides: to the extent that the protection afforded may result
in less than the full equivalent of the secured creditor's interest, that
creditor is afforded a claim which shall have priority over every
other priority claim."'
C. Postpetition Effect of Security Interest
As was mentioned above, if a prepetition security interest covers
proceeds of collateral, those proceeds, received postpetition, become
"cash collateral" which the debtor may use only upon order of the
court. Otherwise, property acquired by the debtor after commencement of the chapter 11 case is not subject to any lien resulting from
any security agreement entered into by the debtor before com2
mencement of the case."
In an earlier version of the provision affecting proceeds it was
stated that the prepetition security interest extended to such proceeds "except to the extent that the estate acquired the proceeds to
the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims.""' 3 The
exception was intended to cover the situation where the estate expends funds that result in an increase in the value of the collateral.
For example, where raw materials were converted into inventory, or
inventory into accounts, at some expense to the estate, thus depleting the fund available to general unsecured creditors, the prepetition security interest was not permitted to improve the position of
the secured creditor as it existed at the filing of the petition in the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 340.
11 U.S.C.A. § 361(1), (2) (West Supp. 1979).
Id. § 361(3).
Id. § 507(b).
Id. § 552(a).
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 552(b) (1977).
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case. The compromise between the House bill and the Senate
amendment resulted in altering the earlier language to a provision
allowing the court, after notice and a hearing, "and based on the
equities of the case," to order otherwise."' It is doubtful that this
results in any material change in meaning. The court still may make
such adjustment to the valuation of the secured creditor's collateral
that the adequate protection provided will not recognize any improvement in that creditor's position.
D.

Turnover of Property to the Estate

Anyone holding property of the estate on the date of the filing of
the petition, or property that the debtor or trustee may use, sell, or
lease, may be required to deliver it to the debtor or trustee." 5 If such
property is held by a custodian, the turnover proceeding is a contested matter."' If it is held by anyone other than a custodian, the
turnover is an adversary proceeding." 7 This proceeding arises in,
and is directly related to the pending case in the bankruptcy court
and may be brought in that court." 8 The jurisdiction of the court is
beyond cavil; the bona fide adverse-merely colorable argument is
gone for good.
E.

Sale Free and Clear

The debtor or trustee may sell property free and clear of any
interest in the property of another entity. The sale may be free and
clear if applicable nonbankruptcy law permits it,"' if the other entity consents, 20 if the interest is a lien and the sale price is greater
than the amount secured by the lien,' 2 ' if the interest is in bona fide
dispute, 22 or if the other entity could be compelled to accept money
satisfaction of the interest in a legal or equitable proceeding.' At a
sale free and clear of other interests, any holder of such interest will
114.
115.
lease" is
116.
governed
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West Supp. 1979).
Id. §§ 542, 543. It should be noted that "property that the trustee may use, sell, or
broader than "property of the estate."
Id. § 543; Bankruptcy Rules 701(1) and 604. Accordingly, the proceeding will be
by Bankruptcy Rule 914.
11 U.S.C.A. § 542 (West Supp. 1979); Bankruptcy Rule 701(1).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1473(a) (West Supp. 1979).
11 U.S.C.A. § 363(f)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
Id. § 363(f)(2).
Id. § 363(f)(3).
Id. § 363(f)(4).
Id. § 363(f)(5).
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be permitted to bid. If that holder is the high bidder, he will be
permitted to offset the value of his interest against the purchase
price of the property, and be liable to the debtor or trustee only for
the balance of the sale price, if any. 4
F. Sale of Jointly-owned Property
"Property which the [debtor or] trustee may use" is broader
than "property of the estate," and the debtor or trustee may recover
from others property in which the debtor has only an undivided
ownership interest. He is permitted to sell a co-owner's interest in
property in which he had an undivided ownership interest such as
a joint tenancy, a tenancy in common, a tenancy by the entirety,
or a community property interest." 5 The sale free and clear of such
other interest is permissible only if partition is impracticable,' if
the sale of the estate's interest would realize significantly less for the
estate than sale of the property free of the interests of the coowners,'27 and if the benefits to the estate of such sale outweigh any
detriment to the co-owners. 2 8 The community interest of a non-

debtor spouse, or interest of the other co-owner is protected by permitting the co-owner to purchase the property being sold at the
price at which the sale is to be consummated.'29
G. Obtaining Credit
Without credit few debtors can survive in a reorganization proceeding. Under both Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the
debtor was not permitted to incur any credit, either secured or unsecured, without court approval. Under the Code, unless the court
orders otherwise, the debtor or trustee may obtain unsecured credit
and incur unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business without
a court order, and any debt so incurred automatically is entitled to
a first priority as an administrative claim.2 0 Any unsecured debt
incurred other than in the ordinary course of business will be allowed a first priority only if the court has authorized its incurrence
124. Id. § 363(k).
125. Id. § 363(h). Community property is the subject of an article by Alan Pedlar in this
issue of the Journal.
126. Id. § 363(h)(1).
127. Id. § 363(h)(2).
128. Id. § 363(h)(3).
129. Id. § 363(i).
130. Id. § 364(a).
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after notice and a hearing. 3 ' In order to avoid a later argument over
whether or not the credit was extended in the ordinary course of
business, and the risk of losing his priority, the supplier or lender
who is willing to extend unsecured credit to the debtor will be wise
to require court approval of the transaction.
If the debtor cannot obtain credit on a totally unsecured basis,
then, with court approval, credit may be obtained with priority over
all other administrative expenses, 3 ' secured by a lien on property
of the estate that is not otherwise subject to a lien,"3 or secured by
a junior lien on property of the estate that is subject to a lien.' 1 If
the debtor still is unable to obtain credit, the court, after notice and
a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of new credit which is secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate, but only if'
adequate protection is provided for the lienholder whose lien is to
be primed. 3 5 The debtor has the burden of proof on the issue of
adequate protection. 36
H.

Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases

Ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses in leases and other executory
contracts are invalidated by the Code. Notwithstanding a provision
in an executory contract, or unexpired lease, or in applicable nonbankruptcy law, such contract or lease may not be terminated or
modified because of the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor,3 7 the filing of a case under title 11,*" or the appointment or
taking possession by a trustee in a case under title 11, or of a custodian before the filing of the case under title 11.""'
Coupled with the invalidation of ipso facto clauses are provisions
permitting the assumption 40 and subsequent reassignment 4 ' of executory contracts and leases. If there has been a default in a contract
131. Id. § 364(b).
132. Id. § 364(c)(1).
133. Id. § 364(c)(2).
134. Id. § 364(c)(3).
135. Id. § 364(d)(1). It would seem that if in this situation the debtor has sufficient
property with which to furnish such protection, that same property would be sufficient security for the new borrowing.
136. Id. § 364(d)(2).
137. Id. 365(e)(1)(A). The protection of this subparagraph expires on the closing of the
case.
138. Id. § 365(e)(1)(B).
139. Id. § 365(e)(1)(C).
140. Id. § 365(b).
141. Id. § 365(f).
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or lease, before the debtor may assume it he must cure, or provide
adequate assurance that he will promptly cure, the default, 4 ' compensate, or provide adequate assurance that he will promptly compensate, the other party to such contract for any actual pecuniary
loss resulting from the default,' and provide adequate assurance of
future performance under such contract or lease.'44 The cure provisions do not apply to ipso facto clauses,'45 and there are special
limiting provisions applying to assumption and assignment of shopping center leases."' If there has been a default in a lease, the debtor
may not require the lessor to provide services or supplies incidental
to the lease unless the lessor is compensated for any services and
supplies provided under the lease before assumption.'4 7 A contract
to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accomodations, to the debtor or for the benefit of the debtor may not be
assumed, and may not be assigned."'
The debtor may assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease at any time before the confirmation of a plan, but the
court, on request of a party to the contract or lease, may order the
debtor to determine within a specified time whether to assume or
reject it."' The effective date of the rejection is stated in section
365(d).
The Bankruptcy Act provision to the effect that the rejection of
an unexpired lease by the trustee of the lessor does not deprive the
lessee of his estate, 50 which no one could understand or apply, has
been corrected. The lessee may treat the lease as terminated by
such rejection, or he may remain in possession for the balance of the
term of the lease, including any renewal or extension of the term
that is enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. 5 ' If the lessee opts
to remain in possession, he may offset against the rent reserved
142. Id. § 365(b)(1)(A).
143. Id. § 365(b)(1)(B).
144. Id. § 365(b)(1)(C).
145. Id. § 365(b)(2).
146. Id. § 365(b)(3).
147. Id. § 365(b)(4).
148. Id. § 365(c)(2).
149. Id. § 365(d)(2). The other party to an executory contract with the debtor occupies
an equivocal position. Until the contract is rejected he is not a creditor with an allowable
claim. The result sought to be achieved by this subsection was available pre-Code without
express statutory authority. See In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., Inc., 113 F.2d 881 (2d
Cir. 1940).
150. Bankruptcy Act § 70b (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(b)).
151. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
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under the lease any damages occurring after the date of rejection
caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtorlessor after that date, but must forego any other claim against the
estate on account of damages arising from such rejection.'52
I.

Utility Service

The debtor is given some, though it may be short-lived, protection
from a cut-off of service by a utility because of the filing of a case
under title 11. A utility, be it the telephone company, the gas company, or the electric company, may not alter, refuse, or discontinue
service, or discriminate against a debtor solely on the basis that a
prepetition bill was not paid.' 5 However, if within 20 days after
filing the debtor does not furnish adequate assurance of payment,
in the form of a deposit or other security, for service after that date
the utility company is free to act as it may see fit." 4 On request of
a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may
order reasonable modification of the amount of deposit or other
security necessary to provide adequate assurance of payment. ' In
this manner the Code seems to have attempted to accomodate the
holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in both In re
FontainebleauHotel Corp., 56 and In re Security Investment Properties, Inc. "
The 20-day period of the Code does not allow the debtor much
time to negotiate the amount of the security demanded by the utility company. Even if the debtor should file a motion with the court
to intercede in the matter immediately upon the filing of the chapter 11 petition, the court may not be able to schedule a hearing on
it in this short time. Also, the requirements of due process must be
met, and a hearing cannot be scheduled immediately. In this circumstance, surely the bankruptcy court must have the power to
152. Id. § 365(h)(2).
153. Id. § 366(a).
154. Id. § 366(b).
155. Id. § 366(b).
156. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Simon, 508 F.2d 1055, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975), holding
that a hotel's telephone numbers are a valuable property which the bankruptcy court could
protect by enjoining their being disconnected, and denying the telephone company's request
for a deposit to assure payment of future services.
157. Georgia Power Co. v. Security Inv. Properties, Inc., 559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977),
in which the court reversed the bankruptcy court and district court orders enjoining the
disconnecting of electric service for refusal to post security for future service.
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enjoin temporarily a cut-off pending a hearing. 5 ' If the debtor operates an apartment project and files a chapter 11 petition in midJuly, a cut-off of the electricity needed to operate the air conditioning surely would end all hopes for rehabilitation. It is believed that
the reasoning of Security Investment Properties is not intended to
deprive the court of the power to preserve the status quo by issuing
such a restraining order.
VI.

COMMITTEES OF CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS

As soon as is practicable after the order for relief, the court shall
appoint a committee of unsecured creditors.' 9 In pilot districts the
appointment is made automatically by the United States trustees.'!'
These provisions mean that in every case, large or small, there must
be at least one committee. Committees to represent equity security
holders, or additional creditors' committees, may be appointed only
by court order made on request of a party in interest." ' In pilot
districts these committees also are appointed by the United States
trustee.
A creditors' committee ordinarily shall consist of persons willing
to serve that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor of the
kinds represented on such committee.' 2 This same subsection permits the court or the United States trustee to recognize and appoint
a committee organized by creditors before the order for relief if such
committee was fairly chosen and is representative of the different
kinds of claims to be represented.' 63 The language of section 1102 is
precatory only. The court or the United States trustee is not compelled to designate a committee consisting of seven persons, nor is
it compelled to select the committee members only from the largest
claims or equity security holders in any given class."' Any party in
interest who does not consider the committee appointed by either
the court or the United States trustee to be representative of the
158. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West Supp. 1979).
159. Id. 1102(a)(1). The functions of the committee are set forth in section 1103(c).
160. Id. § 151102(a).
161. Id. §§ 1102(a)(2), 151102(b).
162. Id. § 1102(b)(1).
163. The purpose in having the committee appointed by the court or the United States
trustee rather than permitting them to be elected as was done under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act was to discourage lawyer control of such committees for his own gain. See
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 93. There is substantial sentiment that the recognition
of prepetition committees will defeat, or at least materially weaken, that purpose.
164. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
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class for which it was appointed has the right to request the court
to change the membership or the size of the committee to balance
the representation of the particular classes.' 5
Although Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act contained no recognition of an "official" committee of either creditors or stockholders,
multiple committees representing divergent classes and interests in
those cases were not uncommon. Because such committees were not
"official," the services for which compensation might be allowed
were restricted. 6 ' Chapter XI recognized only one committee, which
usually is referred to as the "official" committee." 7 There is no
inhibition against "unofficial" committees in chapter 11 cases, as
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. However, an attorney or
other professional person employeed by an "unofficial" committee
may be compensated out of the estate only for having made a substantial contribution in the chapter 11 case.' This is quite similar
to the restrictions on compensation in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act. The professional persons employed by committees appointed
under section 1102 of the Code are not subject to such restriction;
they may be compensated from the estate based on time, nature and
value of their services, and the cost of comparable services in nonbankruptcy matters." 9 This compares favorably with the kinds of
services which were considered compensable under Chapter XI.
However, by providing for compensation based on the "cost of comparable services other than in a case under" title 111'11 it was the
intent to overrule In re Beverly Crest Convalescent Hospital,Inc., '7'
and similar cases which required fees to be determined based on
notions of conservation of the estate and economy of administration,
and obvious resentment of the fact that practicing attorneys expect
to be compensated at a higher hourly rate than federal district
judges.7 2
165. Id. § 1102(c).
166. Bankruptcy Act §§ 242, 243 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 642,
643).
167. Bankruptcy Act § 337 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 737); Rule
11-25.
168. 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1979).
169. Id. §§ 328, 330.
170. Id. § 330(a)(1).
171. 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976, as amended 1977).
172. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 330 states:
If [Beverly Crest] were allowed to stand, attorneys that could earn much higher
incomes in other fields would leave the bankruptcy arena. Bankruptcy specialists, who
enable the system to operate smoothly, efficiently, and expeditiously, would be driven
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There are restrictions on the employment of professional persons
by an appointed committee. Such persons must be selected at a
scheduled meeting of the committee at which a majority of the
members are present, and may be employed only if approved by the
court.' A person employed to represent such committee may not,
while employed by the committee, represent any other person or
entity in the case.'74 If the professional person had been representing
a creditor at the commencement of the case, he must give up that
representation if he is to serve the committee in the case.

VII.

APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE OR EXAMINER

In an apparent attempt at appeasement of the champions of old
Chapter XI and debtors in possession, the Code presumes that the
debtor will remain in possession and continue to operate his business in a chapter 11 case. A trustee may be appointed only on order
of the court, made on request of a party in interest and after notice
and a hearing, and for cause shown.'7 5 The number of holders of the
debtor's securities or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor
specifically are excluded from consideration by the court as cause
for the appointment of a trustee. "6 Cause includes fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the debtor's affairs
by current management, either before or after commencement of
the case. "7 The appointment of a trustee also may be made if such
appointment is in the interest of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate.'78
At this point it should be obvious to everyone, especially those
who have had to cope with a motion under section 328 of the Bankruptcy Act or Rule 11-15, that these factors referred to in section
elsewhere, and the bankruptcy field would be occupied by those who could not find
other work and those who practice bankruptcy law only occasionally almost as a public
service. Bankruptcy fees that are lower than fees in other areas of the legal profession
may operate properly when the attorneys appearing in bankruptcy cases do so intermittently, because a low fee in a small segment of a practice can be absorbed by other
work. Bankruptcy specialists, however, if required to accept fees in all of their cases
that are consistently lower than fees they could receive elsewhere, will not remain in
the bankruptcy field.
173. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a) (West Supp. 1979).
174. Id.§ 1103(b).
175. Id.§ 1104.
176. Id.§ 1104(a)(1), (a)(2).
177. Id.§ 1104(a)(1).
178. Id. § 1104(a)(2).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss2/6

24

Moller: Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened to Go

19791

CHAPTER 11

1104(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Code are the very ones harped on by the
SEC, and by the rare others who file such motions, as the reasons
why a case should be transferred from Chapter XI to Chapter X.
Truly, then, has the change effected by the Code done anything
more than to give a new name to the same motion and the same
hearing?
If the court decides that a trustee should be appointed, the person
chosen for such appointment does not have to be selected from the
panel of private trustees established under 28 U.S.C. section 604(f).
In pilot districts, when the court decides that a trustee should be
appointed, the appointment is made by the United States trustee;
the person selected does not have to be chosen from the panel of
private trustees established under 28 U.S.C. section 586(b), but is
subject to approval by the court.'79 The United States trustee has
standing to request the appointment of a trustee or an examiner in
these cases.' s°
The protection afforded by a trustee would be needed in cases
where current management of the debtor has been fraudulent or
dishonest, or has grossly mismanaged the company affairs. A trustee
would be needed also where the debtor's management has abandoned the business.'"' Generally, a trustee would not be needed in
any case where the functions to be performed could be provided by
an examiner. Where current management is adequate, but there is
evidence of some misdeeds by former management, the necessary
investigation can be conducted by an examiner, presumably at a
lesser cost to the estate than if a trustee were to be appointed.
If the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than for
goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider,' 2 exceed $5,000,000
the court must, on application by a party in interest, appoint an
examiner if it does not appoint a trustee.' 3 This appointment must
be made whether or not there is any evidence of fraud or mismanagement by either current or past management. The inconsistency
in this provision is obvious. In deciding whether a trustee should be
179. Id. § 151102(a).
180. Id. § 1104(a).
181. This is a situation which may occur with some frequency after October 1, 1979. It
is unlikely that an individual proprietor will stay in place very long after an order for relief is
entered against him in an involuntary chapter 11 case.
182. Id. § 101(25) defines an "insider."
183. Id. § 1104(b)(2). The examiner's duties are set out in section 1106(b), and include,
in addition to the specific duties, "any other duties of the trustee that the court orders the
debtor in possession not to perform."
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appointed, the court is forbidden to consider the amount of the
debtor's assets or liabilities.'84 Yet the court is given no discretion
in the matter of appointment of an examiner if the amount of the
debts exceeds the stated minimum.
There is a major oversight regarding the examiner. The Code
contains provisions detailing the employment of professional persons by a trustee, 5' and there are elaborate and detailed provisions
regarding the compensation of the persons so employed.'" Conspicuously absent are any provisions for the employment of professional
persons by an examiner, and any provisions regarding the compensation of any such persons. There is no doubt that in conducting an
investigation the examiner must have the assistance of accountants,
attorneys, and possibly others. This matter seems to have escaped
the attention of the committees of both Houses of Congress in earlier
competing drafts of the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act, 7 as well
as in the final draft which was passed amid great confusion of lastminute amendments and compromises, in October, 1978.
Is it safe to assume that the court has inherent power to authorize
an examiner to employ such professional persons, and likewise to
allow them compensation? Perhaps. More likely, probably not. The
accepted tenets of statutory construction force the conclusion that
Congress, having provided for the employment and compensation of
professional persons by trustees, debtors, and committees, but not
by examiners, intended that an examiner should not employ such
persons, and that no compensation should be permitted in the event
any might be so employed. "'
It would seem that corrective legislation is required if the provisions in the Code concerning the appointment of an examiner are
not to become totally meaningless.
VIII.

MEETINGS OF CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS

The Code contemplates that within a reasonable time after the
order for relief in a case under title 11, including a chapter 11 case,
there shall be a meeting of creditors. 89 In addition, in a case involv184. Id. § 1104(a)(1), (a)(2).
185. Id. § 327.
186. Id. §§ 328, 330, 331.
187. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
188. Cf. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust
Co. (In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc.), 597 F.2d 348 (2d. Cir. 1979).
189. 11 U.S.C.A. § 341(a) (West Supp. 1979).
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ing a corporation, the court may order a meeting of any equity
security holders.9 0 Until new rules may be promulgated, it is not at
all certain whether Rule 10-212 or Rule 11-25 will apply to govern
the time of such meeting. In any event, the court may not preside
at, and may not attend, any such meeting. 9' This, of course, creates
a problem regarding the conduct of such meeting. There is no guidance in existing rules or in the Code. It would appear that in pilot
districts the meeting might be presided over by the United States
trustee. In those or any other districts it also makes sense to have
the chairman of the creditors' committee or the attorney for the
creditors' committee to preside. Or, if a trustee or an examiner has
been appointed by the time of the initial meeting, he might preside.
Until new rules may be promulgated to offer some guidance, this is
another matter that will have to be governed by a local rule or order
of the bankruptcy court. Whoever may preside at such meeting, the
debtor is required to appear and submit to examination under oath,
and he may be examined by creditors, any indenture trustee, or by
the trustee or examiner.'92
IX.

FILING AND ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS

The concept of provability of claims contained in section 63 of the
Bankruptcy Act has been scrapped by the Code. In its place we now
have a concept of allowability of claims and interests." 3 The purpose
of the change is to make all claims allowable and to avoid traps for
the unwary such as the provision in the Bankruptcy Act which
denied provability to a claim of damages for negligence unless a suit
had been instituted prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
and was still pending at the time of such filing. 4 In addition, the
Code requires the estimation of contingent or unliquidated claims""
which frequently were denied allowability in a bankruptcy proceeding because liquidation or estimation of such claim would unduly
delay administration of the proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act." '
Whether the claim was denied provability or allowability, the end
190. Id. § 341(b).
191. Id. § 341(c).
192. Id. § 342.
193. Id. §§ 501, 502.
194. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
103(a)(7)).
195. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(c) (West Supp. 1979).
196. Bankruptcy Act § 57d (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 93(d)).
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result was another nondischargeable debt for the bankrupt or
debtor.
In the context of a chapter 11 case, there are special rules regarding the proof of claims and interests. These are contained in section
7
1111. If a claim or interest is scheduled by the debtor or trustee"
as not disputed, not contingent, and not unliquidated, it is deemed
filed under section 501.11 In turn, a claim filed under section 501 is
deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects to it."' Thus,
creditors and interest holders who are scheduled in this manner by
the debtor or trustee do not have to bother with filing claims in the
case in order to vote and to participate in distribution under any
plan which may be confirmed in the case. However, if the claim or
interest is scheduled by the debtor or trustee as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, the holder of that claim or interest is required
to file a proof of claim or interest in the case if he is to participate
in distribution under the plan."0 The holder of the claim or interest
must determine for himself how his claim or interest is scheduled.
These Code provisions are parallel to the existing Chapter X Rules""
rather than the Chapter XI Rules.02
A proof of claim as filed constitutes prima facie evidence of the
validity and amount of the claim, 203 as was the case under the Bank-

ruptcy Act and Rules. The Code does not specify the time within
which the required proofs must be filed. Accordingly, until new rules
are promulgated a bar order fixing such time must be entered by
the court.
X. THE PLAN
In the debate on consolidation of the business reorganization
chapters, the argument was made that Chapter XI, in permitting a
plan to be filed only by the debtor, allowed the debtor too much
power. Mr. Trost refers to it as "the almost arrogant power of the
chapter XI debtor to force liquidation if creditors do not agree to his
business rescue plan.

20 4

This view seems not to recognize the power

over the plan wielded by a strong creditors' committee. In the pro197. Under section 521(1) or section 1106(a)(2).
198. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1111(a) (West Supp. 1979).
199. Id. § 502(a).
200. Id. § 1111(a).
201. Rule 10-401.
202. Rule 11-33.
203. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(a) (West Supp. 1979).
204. Note 2, supra.
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cess of negotiating a plan the debtor has always been fully aware
that the demands of the creditors' committee must be met or an
adjudication could follow. For management of a corporate debtor
the
the prospect of adjudication might not be all that important. It'
alive
were
kept
more
if
the
business
they
could
get
creditors thought
there was nothing to prevent their filing an involuntary Chapter X
petition in the pending Chapter XI case, letting a trustee displace
old management, and try to resurrect a viable business from the
ruins. If the debtor was an individual and he preferred liquidation
to some plan other than his own, nothing could prevent his choosing
liquidation. He could ask for adjudication and walk away with his
exempt property.
The situation under the Code has not really changed all that
much. In a voluntary chapter 11 case, as long as he remains in
possession the debtor still has the option at any time to convert to
a case under chapter 7, the Bankruptcy Code equivalent of adjudication and liquidation under the Act, and his conversion filed in the
'
chapter 11 case constitutes an order for relief under chapter 7,' 11
whether the creditors like it or not. True, if the creditors wish they
may seek to re-convert to chapter 11,200 but if the debtor chooses,
as he probably will, they will have to get along without him, and
they may not use any of his exempt property to promote a plan
which they may later file in the case. 07 Has chapter 11 really advanced the cause of the creditors all that much, then, when the
debtor is an individual?
A.

Who May File a Plan

Whether, the case originated with a voluntary or an involuntary
petition, if the debtor has been retained in possesson he has the
exclusive right to file a plan for 120 days after the date of the order
for relief.208 If the debtor does file a plan within this period, he has
an additional 60 days in which to obtain the necessary acceptances,
and no one else may file a plan during such additional time.2 " The
court, for cause shown, may reduce or extend the 120-day period or
the 180-day period.2
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

11 U*S.C.A. § 1112 (West Supp. 1979).
Id.§ 706(b).
Id.§ 1123(c).
Id.§ 1121(b).
Id.§ 1121(c)(3).
Id.§ 1121(d).
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When a trustee is appointed, the debtor loses the exclusive right
to file a plan; any party in interest may file a plan at any time after
such appointment."' In this context the debtor is a party in interest,"' and is entitled to file a plan if he chooses. The appointment
of an examiner in the case does not affect the debtor's exclusive
right to file a plan during the stated period.
B.

Classification of Claims or Interests

Integral to the formulation of a plan is the classification of claims
and interests. The plan may classify claims or interests as long as
each class is composed of substantially similar claims or interests."'
However, small unsecured claims, whether or not substantially similar, may be designated as a separate class, subject to court approval
as an administrative convenience.21 ' Pre-Code this treatment of
small claims was accomplished without express authority. Under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act and the rules the need for this
treatment was greater because a filed but nonvoting claim was
counted as a negative vote, whereas plan provisions for payment of
these claims in full meant that they were not "materially and adversely affected," rendering it unnecessary for such class to vote.
There is less need for such a provision under the Code because the
majorities required for acceptance of a plan are based only on those
that actually vote;"t 5 a nonvote does not count as a rejection.
C. Contents of a Plan
The mandatory21 and permissive" 7 provisions of a plan are lifted
almost verbatim from Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act." 8 Some of
these provisions fit a corporation or a railroad far better than they
do an individual debtor. 21 One mandatory provision of a plan ap-

pears in the confirmation section of the Code rather than in section
1123 where one might expect it; a plan is required to accomodate
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. § 1121(c)(1).
Id. § 1121(c)(1).
Id. § 1122(a).
Id. § 1122(b).
Id. § 1126(c).
Id. § 1123(a).
Id. § 1123(b).
See Bankruptcy Act § 216 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 616).
E.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(a)(5)(I), (a)(5)(J), (a)(6), (a)(7) (West Supp. 1979).
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priority claims.12 0 Administrative expenses"2 ' and claims arising in
the ordinary course of business after commencement of an involuntary case and before appointment of a trustee or entry of the order
for relief 2 2 must be provided for in cash. 23 Priority wage claims, '
contributions to employee benefit plans, 25 and consumer deposits " "
may be classified and provided for on a deferred basis, but payment
in cash will be required for any such class which fails to accept the
plan.22 7 Priority tax claims2 28 may be paid over a period of time not
exceeding six years after the date of assessment of the tax,2" ' and
consent to such treatment by the tax gatherer is not required. These
changes in prior law are designed to reduce the cash requirements
for confirmation.
One substantial change from Chapter XI is that a plan may provide for a partial or total liquidation of the debtor's assets,13 thus
overruling cases like In re Pure Penn Petroleum Co., Inc., 3 ' which
would not permit such a plan.
D.

Disclosure Statement

In cases under chapter 11, both large and small, before there may
be any postpetition solicitation of acceptances, the proponent of a
plan must submit and the court must approve, a disclosure statement. 232 This requirement is new. Nothing comparable to it appeared in the Bankruptcy Act.2 33 Despite the specific provision in
the Code that the adequacy of the disclosure statement is not governed by any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, rule, or regu220. Id. § 1129(a)(9).
221. Id. § 507(a)(1).
222. Id. § 507(a)(2).
223. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A).
224. Id. § 507(a)(3).
225. Id. § 507(a)(4).
226. Id. § 507(a)(5).
227. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B).
228. Id. § 507(a)(6).
229. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
230. Id. § 1123(b)(4).
231. 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951). The case has been criticized, and occasionally, at least
outside the Second Circuit, not followed.
232. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(b) (West Supp. 1979). The disclosure statement is the subject
of an article by Robin Phelan and Bruce Cheatham elsewhere in this issue of the Journal.
233. In the sense only that some court action was required before postpetition solicitation
of acceptances of a plan could begin, Bankruptcy Act § 174 and Rule 10-303 required court
approval of a plan as a predicate to solicitation.
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lation,24 it is probable that the SEC, which has the right to raise
an issue in a chapter 11 case and to appear and be heard on it,2

will attempt to convince the bankruptcy courts that these disclosure
statements should comply with SEC regulations.
E.

Acceptance of the Plan

The percentage of votes required by the Code for acceptance of a
plan differs from all three rehabilitation chapters of the Bankruptcy
Act. So also does the method of computing the vote.
Under the Code, a class of creditors has accepted a plan when a
majority in number and two-thirds in amount of creditors in the
class vote to accept it. A class of equity security holders has accepted the plan when two-thirds in amount of interests in the class
vote to accept it. In both instances, the vote is computed on only
creditors and interest holders who actually vote. The negative vote
imputed to a creditor or interest holder who had filed a proof of
claim or interest but did not vote on the plan2 3 is gone.237 Even so,
it seems difficult to rationalize the increase over the percentages
required by Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.
There are two classes or types of creditors and interest holders
whose vote is not required: (1) A class that is not impaired under a
plan is deemed to have accepted the plan.238 Therefore, the solicitation of acceptances from holders of claims or interests in such class
is not required. (2) A class that is to receive nothing under the plan
is deemed to have rejected the plan. 39 In this second situation, if
any class is excluded, before the court may confirm such a plan, it
must find that the plan is fair and equitable as to such class and to
any class below it. In other words, the presence of such a rejecting
class will require a valuation of the debtor and a determination that
the reorganization values do not reach this class or any below it
before confirmation is possible.
234. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 1979).
235. Id. § 1109(a). However, the SEC may not appeal from any judgment, order, or
decree entered in the case. There is nothing to prevent its joining in an appeal taken by a
true party in interest.
236. Rule 10-305(e), Rule 12-37(d). Bankruptcy Act § 362(1) (repealed 1978, previously
codified as 11 U.S.C. § 762(i)).
237. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1126(c) (West Supp. 1979).
238. Id. § 1126(f).
239. Id. § 1126(g).
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F.

Impairment of Claims or Interests

The Bankruptcy Act concept of "materially and adversely affected" classes 40 has been replaced by the concept of "impairment"
of claims or interests.24 A class of claims or interests is impaired
under a plan unless the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable,
and contractual rights" of the class of claims or interests, 42 cures
any default that occurred before commencement of the case, 243 or
the holders are paid in cash.2 " If by these standards a class is impaired, its acceptance is required;2 45 if such impaired class does not
accept, the cram down must be invoked, and the plan must be "fair
25
and equitable" as to such class and any below it.
As has been mentioned, a curing of default does not result in the
impairment of a claim. This authority to cure a prepetition default
without requiring the consent of that creditor or class of creditors is
new. 247 Since such creditor is deemed to be unimpaired, his acceptance of the plan is not needed. If the claim was based on an
installment-type loan that, because of the debtor's default, had
been accelerated before the commencement of the chapter 11 case,
the debtor may reverse the acceleration and reinstate the loan by
providing in the plan for payment of the missed installments, for the
compensation of the holder of such claim for any damages incurred
as a reasonable result of reliance by such holder on such contractual
provision, and for reinstatement of the maturity of such claim as it
existed before the default. 248 If the prepetition default was because
of an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause no cure is required.248 The
maturity as provided in the original note or other obligation must
be reinstated exactly as written. If the debtor should seek to extend
the maturity date, the creditor's acceptance will be required.
XI.

CONFIRMATION OF THE PLAN

The first six requirements for confirmation of a plan 5 0 are lifted
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Bankruptcy Act § 308 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 708).
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1124 (West Supp. 1979).
Id. § 1124(1).
Id. § 1124(2).
Id. § 1124(3).
Id. § 1129(a)(8).
See id. § 1129(b).
Id. § 1124(2).
Id.§ 1124(2).
See id.365(b)(2).
Id.§ 1129(a)(1)-(a)(6).
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almost verbatim out of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.25 ' There
are no surprises here. The vital requirements for confirmation are
found in subparagraphs (7) and (8) of section 1129(a) of the Code.
It has been reported that the design of the Code draftsmen was to
adopt the interest of creditors test of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act and to avoid the fair and equitable test of Chapter X whenever
a chapter 11 plan has been accepted by all impaired classes of
claims and interests. The question is whether or not they have
achieved such an aspiration.
Even though each impaired class has accepted the plan by the
requisite majorities,12 the court still must find, with respect to each
class, that each holder of a claim or interest within that class who
voted against the plan will receive or retain under the plan property
of a value that is not less than the amount that he would receive or
retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 on the effective
date of the plan. 23 If any holder of a claim or interest who voted
"no" will receive or retain less, the plan cannot be confirmed.
Determining the hypothetical distribution in a liquidation under
chapter 7 is no simple matter. The court will have to consider the
various subordination provisions which apply in chapter 7254 as well
as the tax-claim postponement provisions.2 5 5 In addition, in partnership cases the rules governing partnership distributions,2 56 and
where community property is involved, rules regarding distributions
of community property,27 must be fully accomodated.
It is apparent that the financial standards of confirmation have
been made exceedingly complex by the provisions of the Code. They
are difficult to comprehend; their application is well-nigh impossible. Should the court, in that attempted application, go wrong regarding a single creditor or interest holder, reversal of the order of
confirmation may well result. Inevitably, then, appeals from confirmation orders may be expected to increase, as will reversals on
appeal. During the delay caused by such appeals, the debtor will be
in limbo, and regardless of the outcome may, as a result, simply
expire.
251. Bankruptcy Act § 221 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 621).
252. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(8)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
253. Id.§ 1129(a)(7).
254. Id. §§ 510, 726(a)(3), 726(a)(4).
255. Id. § 724.
256. Id. § 723.
257. Id. § 726(c).
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A.

Cram Down

What happens when one or more classes of creditors and interests do not accept a plan? It then becomes necessary to resort to
the cram down provisions of the Code. ' At this writing, only one
' has represented
writer 59
that he understands those provisions,
and even he describes an understanding of the Code cram down as
requiring "a torturous journey through the statute and legislative
history that is fraught with complex concepts, terms of art, and innuendo."26 ° Accordingly, this article defers to the only one who
purports to understand them all discussion of those provisions.
XI.

THE DISCHARGE

The discharge which results from confirmation of a plan is, except
for an individual debtor, a discharge of all obligations of the debtor
to creditors whether dealt with under the plan or whether or not
those creditors participate in the reorganization."0 ' This is the same
discharge which was provided for in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act.262 The debtor who is an individual still must face debts excepted from discharge under section 523 of the Code. 2 3 This seems
ironic and totally inconsistent with the philosophy expressed in
chapter 7 of the Code, which permits a discharge to only an individ2 4
ual debtor.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

The attempt to cure some real and some imaginary flaws that
existed in the two track system of Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act has resulted in a clear case of overkill. The controls and
the procedures adopted in chapter 11 are carried over from Chapter
X. They are quite appropriate for the multi-million dollar corporations and railroads, of which there are few, but are totally inappropriate for the middle-sized businesses, of which there are many. The
258. Id. § 1129(b).
259. Kenneth N. Klee, who co-authored these provisions.
260. See Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 136 (1979).
261. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1141 (West Supp. 1979).
262. Bankruptcy Act § 224(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
624(1)).
263. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1141(d)(2) (West Supp. 1979).
264. Id. § 727(a)(1).
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torturously complex procedures, the imposition of an acceptance
percentage which is more demanding than even Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, and the stringent financial standards for confirmation including a cram down that is so difficult to comprehend that
even those who drafted it are not completely sure, effectively exclude from relief the proprietorships which are too large to fit chapter 13, as well as corporations which are neither large enough nor
strong enough to survive the new provisions. Chapter 11 may well
become as unpopular as Chapter X.
Whatever happened to good old Chapter XI?
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